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Abstract People often have to make decisions based on
many pieces of information. Previous work has found that
people are able to integrate values presented in a rapid serial
visual presentation (RSVP) stream to make informed judge-
ments on the overall stream value (Tsetsos et al. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 109(24), 9659–9664, 2012). It is also well known
that attentional mechanisms influence how people process in-
formation. However, it is unknown how attentional factors
impact value judgements of integrated material. The current
study is the first of its kind to investigate whether value judge-
ments are influenced by attentional processes when assimilat-
ing information. Experiments 1–3 examined whether the at-
tentional salience of an item within an RSVP stream affected
judgements of overall stream value. The results showed that
the presence of an irrelevant high or low value salient item
biased people to judge the stream as having a higher or lower
overall mean value, respectively. Experiments 4–7 directly
tested Tsetsos et al.’s (Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(24), 9659–
9664, 2012) theory examining whether extreme values in an
RSVP stream become over-weighted, thereby capturing atten-
tion more than other values in the stream. The results showed
that the presence of both a high (Experiments 4, 6 and 7) and a
low (Experiment 5) value outlier captures attention leading to
less accurate report of subsequent items in the stream. Taken
together, the results showed that valuations can be influenced
by attentional processes, and can lead to less accurate subjec-
tive judgements.
Keywords Attention . Decisionmaking
Introduction
Everyday decisions typically involve taking account of many
pieces of information. Making these decisions often requires
the evaluation of differing attributes in order to choose the
option with the highest overall utility. Previous research in
psychology and neuro-economics has examined how people
integrate different sources of information and has shown that,
in a variety of experimental paradigms, the cognitive system
can apply near-optimal strategies and heuristics to make quick
and accurate decisions (e.g., Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis,
Holmes & Cohen, 2006; Sugrue, Corrado & Newsome,
2005).
Recent work has investigated whether people can make
informed overall value judgements by integrating values that
appear in rapid succession. Tsetsos, Chater and Usher (2012)
developed a value psychophysics task in which people viewed
two simultaneously presented rapid serial visual presentation
(RSVP) streams (one on the left one on the right of the screen),
each containing up to 24 numbers. Numbers appeared at a
presentation rate of either two or four items per second (across
different conditions) and the whole stream was described to
participants as reflecting past payments from a slot machine or
stock market values. After each trial participants were
instructed to choose the stream that they thought had the
highest overall value. The results showed that despite the fast
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presentation rate, participants were surprisingly accurate at
amalgamating this information, and chose the stream with
the highest value approximately 80% of the time. However,
further results showed that people’s value judgements were
influenced by certain properties of the stream. First, people
appeared to place more weight on the most recently viewed
information (i.e., numbers presented towards the end of the
stream). Second, people’s judgements seemed biased towards
the most extreme values within a stream, and the direction of
this bias could be influenced by the framing of the task. For
example, when asked to choose the stream with the highest
overall value, people chose the stream with the largest stan-
dard deviation (SD). However, when asked to reject a stream
with the lowest value they also chose the stream with the
largest SD. Tsetsos et al. (2012) hypothesised that this was
because high SD streams tended to contain more extreme
values (both low and high), which participants over-
weighted in their judgements. That is, a high SD stream had
both very high and very low values, which were compared to
the moderate values from the low SD stream. Thus, large
numbers from the high SD stream (paired with moderate
values from low SD) and moderate numbers from the low
SD stream (paired with low values from the high SD stream)
were over-weighted, resulting in a choice bias for the high SD
stream. When considering which stream was the least valu-
able, the locally smaller values influenced choice more strong-
ly. This led to the apparently paradoxical finding that the high
SD stream was chosen over the low SD stream regardless of
whether the task was to choose the stream with the highest or
the lowest overall value.
At the same time asmaking value choices, people also have
to sift through multiple sensory inputs to prioritize the most
important information, to avoid cognitive overload.
Numerous attentional mechanisms that prioritise information
have been identified (e.g., Klein, 1988; Treisman & Gelade,
1980; McLeod, Driver & Crisp, 1988; Abrams & Christ,
2003, 2005; Kunar, Flusberg, Horowitz & Wolfe, 2007;
Kunar & Humphreys, 2006; Kunar, John & Sweetman,
2014; Kunar, Rich & Wolfe, 2010; Russell & Kunar, 2012;
Wolfe et al. 2005; Watson & Kunar, 2010, 2012 see also
Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004 and Wolfe & Horowitz, 2017, for a
recent review of factors that guide attention). Previous re-
search has suggested that what we pay attention to can be
influenced by bottom-up attentional processes (in which
inherently salient properties of a stimulus, such as a unique
colour, capture our attention, e.g. Treisman & Gelade, 1980),
top-down attentional processes (in which cognitive control
modulates what it is that we attend to, e.g. Wolfe et al. 1989)
and a mixture of both (e.g. Folk et al. 1992). More recent
research suggests that attentional control can also be influ-
enced by choice (Kunar, Ariyabandu, & Jami, 2016) and by
reward and selection history (see Awh et al., 2012, for a
modified framework of attentional control). In the context of
the value psychophysics task (Tsetsos et al., 2012), people
attended items driven by top-down processes, prioritizing
the processing of the number that was most relevant to the
response mapping (relatively higher values when selecting
the overall highest and relatively lower numbers when
rejecting the overall lowest stream).
Recent research has begun to investigate whether there is
an interaction between attention, bottom-up visual saliency
and how we make economic choices. For example, Towal,
Mormann and Koch (2013) investigated whether objective
properties of saliency are taken into account when participants
make subjective value judgements. In their experiment they
asked participants to view a grid of four snack foods and
choose which they would most like to eat. The visual salience
of each of the four stimuli was determined using the Itti-Koch
algorithm (Itti, Koch, & Niebur, 1998) and participant’s eye
movements to each of the stimuli were recorded. Towal et al.
(2013) compared several drift-diffusion models of the data
and found that, models that weighted both value and visual
salience of the food product outperformed models driven by
either value or salience alone. The results suggest that, as well
as the subjective value of the food, the bottom-up visual sa-
lience of the product also influenced participant’s choices.
Little is known, though, regarding how attention influences
overall value judgements when people have to integrate mul-
tiple sources of information. Tsetsos et al. (2012) developed a
computational model of their data, and showed that their find-
ings could be accounted for by a leaky (decay-based) accu-
mulation model that integrated all samples of value. The mod-
el placed higher weights on different values determined by
their salience. For example, later samples were weighted more
than earlier samples, consistent with experimental findings
showing a recency bias (where recently viewed items had a
bigger influence on value integration than earlier items).
Furthermore, the model accounted for risk-biases and decoy
effects shown in the experimental data where higher weights
were given to either the high-ranked values or low-ranked
values, in the same stream, depending on task framing.
However, the model did not consider the role that attentionally
salient stimuli play in value integration. That is, although
Tsetsos et al. (2012) hypothesised that outlier numbers were
over-weighted in a value psychophysics task via top-down
strategies, their theory did not consider the impact of
bottom-up attentional effects on value judgements. We inves-
tigate this in Experiments 1–3 by examining the impact of
salient ‘attention-grabbing’ stimuli on value integration.
Theoretically, if humansmake good decisions that are ground-
ed purely on evidence-based inferences, then the presence of
an irrelevant salient item should not affect people’s value
judgements. However, if people instead adopt a heuristic that
over-weights irrelevant yet salient items, as well as top-down
components, we would expect a shift in value preference de-
pendent in the presence of bottom-up factors.
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Past attention research has shown that if an item appears in
a salient, unique colour it will automatically capture attention
(e.g. Treisman &Gelade, 1980, Wolfe, Cave & Franzel, 1989,
Duncan & Humphreys, 1989, Wolfe & Horowitz, 2017).
Therefore, if attentionally salient items were over-weighted
in a stream, judgments of value should be affected by the
presence of these items. In Experiments 1–3 we used the value
psychophysics paradigm developed by Tsetsos et al. (2012) to
test this prediction. In these experiments, participants viewed
two RSVP streams of numbers, and indicated which stream
had the greatest value. In the critical condition, we highlighted
one of the numbers in a salient colour (red in Experiments 1
and 3, green in Experiment 2) which was different to the
colours of the rest of the numbers presented in the stream.
The highlighted number was either a high value or a low value
item.
We determined whether the different coloured item
captured attention and subsequently changed people’s
judgement of the overall stream value. There are two pos-
sible hypotheses. The first predicts, in line with normative
decision theory, that because colour has no relevance to
the task it should be ignored and thus value judgements
would not be influenced by the presence of the uniquely
coloured item. We call this the ‘No Attentional Influence’
hypothesis. The second hypothesis predicts that value
judgements will be influenced by the presence of a differ-
ent coloured value in the stream due to its unique and
salient bottom-up features. According to this account, if
the salient coloured item was of high value, participants
would choose this stream as having a higher overall value
than they would otherwise. Similarly, if the salient
coloured item was of low value, they would choose this
stream as having the higher overall value less often. We
call this the ‘Attentional Influence’ hypothesis. The re-
sults from both experiments showed that value integration
was affected by the attentionally salient item, in line with
the Attentional Influence hypothesis and concurs with the
theory that bottom-up factors play an important role in
value judgements.
The second part of our study tests the assumptions of
Tsetsos et al.’s (2012) account of their Bparadoxical^ pattern
of judgments, in which participants choose the stream of num-
bers with the greatest variability whether they were asked to
identify the stream with the highest average value, or the
stream with the lowest average value. Their theoretical
account and computational model showed this result by
assuming that, when instructed to choose the highest
average value, people will tend to pay more attention to high
values, and, conversely, when instructed to choose the lowest
average value, they will tend to pay more attention to low
values. Thus, the assumption is that effects of task
instructions will impact the amount of attention paid to
unusually high or low values. Specifically, the more variable
stream will tend to be chosen with either set of task
instructions, because it has both more unusually high and
unusually low values. While this theoretical account
provides a simple explanation of the behavioural data,
Tsetsos et al. (2012) did not directly measure whether top-
down factors were indeed manipulating attention differential-
ly, as the model required. Indeed, their account presupposes,
but does not have direct evidence for, the claim that extreme
values in general capture attention more than other values.
This was investigated in Experiments 4–7 by examining
whether outlier numbers, embedded within the stream, cap-
tured attention using a dual-task paradigm, to provide a mea-
sure of the degree of attentional engagement with the critical
numbers. Typically, in dual-task paradigms if attention is en-
gaged in one task, performance in a secondary task suffers
(e.g. Allport, Antonis & Reynolds, 1972; McLeod, 1977;
Kunar et al. 2008). Therefore, performance of a secondary
task can be used to determine whether extreme values capture
more attention than non-extreme values, by the degree to
which they deplete attentional resources needed to detect sub-
sequent items in the same stream (e.g. Chun & Potter, 1995).
In Experiments 4–7 we asked participants to detect the
presence of a specific target number, while also making a
value judgement on the stream. In the critical condition a
high-valued (Experiment 4, 6 and 7) or low-valued
(Experiment 5) outlier number was presented prior to the tar-
get number. We aimed to differentiate between two theoretical
options. The first is that outlier numbers do not capture atten-
tion. In this case, detection of the target number after viewing
an outlier number would be no different to when an outlier
number was absent. We call this the ‘No Capture’ account.
The second possibility is that presentation of an outlier num-
ber would produce a dual-task deficit. Previous research has
shown that there is a limit to what we can attend to (e.g., see
Marois & Ivanoff, 2005 for a review), and that, when attention
is occupied, then the processing of other information in our
environment is impaired (e.g. Broadbent, 1958, Pashler, 1994,
Rensink, 2002, Simons & Chabris, 1999, Kunar et al. 2008,
Kunar & Watson, 2011, 2014, Kunar, Thomas & Watson,
2017). Therefore, if resources were consumed processing the
outlier number then there may not be sufficient remaining to
process the target item, leading to a detriment in target detec-
tion. We call this the ‘Outlier Capture’ account. To preview
the results, the data showed that outlier numbers captured
attention, impairing detection of subsequent items in the
stream. Furthermore, this outlier capture occurred in situations
in which observers were asked to make a value judgement to
the whole stream (Experiments 4, 5 and 7) or just the target
number (Experiment 6) and was greater in earlier lags com-
pared to later ones (Experiment 7). Taken together, the results
of Experiments 1–7 suggest that attentional factors modulate
the integration of value information and in turn influence peo-
ple’s judgements.
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Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Twenty participants (13 female) were recruited from the
University of Warwick participant pool. Their ages ranged from
18 to 22 years. All participants had normal or corrected to normal
visual acuity. We recruited 20 participants per experiment based
on themaximum sample size recruited by Tsetsos et al. (2012). A
power analysis using the effect size reported in the Bequal
means^ condition in Experiment 2 of Tsetsos et al. (2012)
(Cohen’s d = 1.348) showed that the minimum number of par-
ticipants needed to achieve a power of 0.8 in each experiment
was 6.1 Therefore, testing 20 participants per experiment should
provide ample power to detect significant effects, if present.
Stimuli and procedure
Displays were generated, and responses recorded by custom
written computer programs running on a PC. Stimuli were two
digit numbers that subtended a visual angle of 3.3° by 4.7° at a
viewing distance of 57 cm. All stimuli were presented in a
light grey colour (RGB values: 180, 180, 180) apart from the
salient item, which was presented in red (RGB values: 255, 0,
0). On each trial, participants were presented with a fixation
dot (diameter 0.3°) at the centre of the screen for 1000 ms.
After this, participants were presented with two streams of 12
numbers each (similar to conditions used by Tsetsos et al.
2012). One stream was presented 4 visual degrees to the left
of centre and the other stream was presented 4 visual degrees
to the right. Each number in the stream was presented for
250 ms, followed by a blank inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of
50 ms before the next number appeared. In this experiment,
we were interested in whether the presentation of a salient
(red) item within one of the streams influenced people’s value
judgements. Therefore, as we wanted the colour of the crucial
item to be the only difference between the two presented
streams, unbeknownst to the participants, on each trial, both
streams contained the same numbers, presented, however, in
the reverse order (from trial to trial the numbers differed). This
ensured that both streams had the same means (of approxi-
mately 50) and SDs (of approximately 20).2
There were two conditions: a Salient Condition and a
Control Condition. In the Salient Condition, 50% of the time
the highest value in one of the streams was presented in red,
and 50% of the time the lowest value in one of the streams was
presented in red. The red item was presented in the left stream
for half the trials, and in the right stream for the other half and
could appear at any position in either stream. The remaining
numbers in each of the streams were presented in light grey.
Participants were asked to think of the stream as previous
payouts from a slot machine (following the procedure of
Tsetsos et al. 2012), and were told that the red item was not
informative as to which stream had the highest mean. At the
end of each trial participants were asked which of the two
streams they thought had the overall highest mean value, by
pressing the key ‘z’ if they thought it was the left stream and
‘m’ if they thought it was the right stream. If they were unsure
they were asked to guess. No feedback was given. In the
Control Condition, all the numbers in both streams were pre-
sented in light grey. Therefore, the Control Condition served
as a baseline in order to check chance level performance in
this task. The presentation of each condition was
counterbalanced across participants. The Salient Condition
contained 50 trials in which the red item was the highest value
in the stream, and 50 trials in which it was the lowest value.
The Control Condition contained 50 trials in total. The pro-
portion of times each stream was chosen was recorded and
participants performed a short practice block of trials before
each condition. Example displays are shown in Fig. 1.
Results and discussion
Data from one participant were excluded from analysis as they
chose the stream with the red item 100% of the time.3 As
expected in the Control Condition, there was no significant
difference in the proportion of times that each stream was cho-
sen, t(18) = 1.07, P = 0.3, d = 0.492 (0.52 versus 0.48, for left
and right streams, respectively). Neither did the proportion of
times that each stream was chosen differ to that of chance (both
ts = 1.1, ps > 0.29). However, of more interest, in the Salient
Condition, the proportion of times that people chose the stream
when the highest value number was highlighted in red was
greater (0.61) than when the lowest number was highlighted
(0.44), t(18) = 5.09, P < 0.01, d = 1.742. Furthermore, the
proportion of times that each stream was chosen was higher
or lower than chance for the highlighted high and low value
streams, respectively. Participants chose the stream with a
highlighted high number at a level significantly higher than
chance, t(18) = 4.04, P < 0.01, whereas they chose the stream
with a highlighted low number at a level significantly lower
than chance, t(18) = 3.64, P < 0.01.
1 Note that this condition in Tsetsos et al. (2012) is analogous to the experi-
mental design here, in the sense that in both cases participants choose between
two streams of equal mean and their choice probabilities are compared to
chance level (i.e. 50%).
2 Please note that if participants noticed that the streams were identical but
reversed we would expect there to be no difference in value judgements across
streams, regardless of the presentation of a salient item.
3 We excluded this participant’s data as the pattern of response suggested that
the participant did not adhere to the experiment instructions. However, please
note that including this data did not affect the overall pattern of results.
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The results of Experiment 1 are interesting in several ways.
Data from our control condition showed that participants were
at chance, and chose each stream equally as often when asked
to guess which stream had the highest mean. This makes sense
as both streams had the same overall mean value. More im-
portantly, the data showed that judgements were influenced by
the presence of a red item. In the Salient Condition if the red
number was the largest value number, the stream in which it
was present was judged to have the highest overall value sig-
nificantly more often than if the red item was the lowest value
item in the stream. The results cannot be accounted for by any
difference of the mean or the SD between the two streams
because these were identical (Stream 1 was simply Stream 2
presented in the reverse order). The only difference was
whether the highest or lowest value item in the stream ap-
peared as the salient red item. This finding shows that value
judgements of integrated stimuli can be influenced by atten-
tion and illustrate the role of attentional capture in decision-
making. In particular, highlighting a number has a positive or
negative influence on choosing the associated stream depend-
ing on the value (high/low) of the number.
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1; however, here the
salient singleton was green rather than red. This allowed us to
determine that it was the uniqueness of the salient item that
was affecting the results rather than being due to, and restrict-
ed to, capture by a specific colour.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
Twenty participants (18 female) were recruited from the
University of Warwick participant pool. The age range of
the participants was from 18 to 27 years and all reported nor-
mal or corrected to normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure were similar to those of Experiment
1, except that in the Salient Condition, the colour of the salient
item was green (RGB values: 0, 255, 0) rather than red.
Results and discussion
Following the results of Experiment 1, in the Control
Condition there was no significant difference in the proportion
of times that each stream was chosen, t(19) = 0.86, P = 0.4, d
= 1.72 (0.52 versus 0.48, for left and right streams, respec-
tively). However, of more interest, in the Salient Condition the
proportion of times that people chose the stream when the
highest value number was highlighted in green was greater
(0.68) than when the lowest number was highlighted (0.49),
t(19) = 5.85, P < 0.01, d = 8.03. Again the results showed that
the presence of a salient item affected people’s judgements
and that the effect found in Experiment 1 generalised to an-
other colour. People judged the stream to have a higher overall
mean more often when the salient item was high in value
rather than low, even though there was no objective difference
between the means or SDs of the two streams.
One could argue that because the means of both streams
were equal in Experiments 1 and 2, people could use the
‘extra’ information provided by the coloured item to influence
their decisions. If so the same influence of the salient item
should not occur when the means of the stream were different
and so there was an objectively correct response to which
stream had the highest overall mean. We tested this possibility
in Experiment 3, in which participants saw two streams that
had different means (60 vs. 40). As in Experiment 1, in the
Salient Condition, either the highest or lowest number within
one of the streams was highlighted in red. We investigate
whether the salient item still influenced people’s judgements
when the mean values of each stream were objectively
different.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants
Twenty participants (15 female) were recruited from the
University of Warwick participant pool. The age range of
the participants was from 19 to 24 years4 and all reported
normal or corrected to normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure were similar to those of Experiment
1, except that the means of the streams differed. In each trial,
one of the streams had a mean of 60 and the other stream had a
mean of 40. Both streams had a SD of 20. The stream with the
larger mean was presented on the left for half the trials and on
4 One participant declined to give their age.
51 45 38 92 75 26 ……
Time 
45 51 …
Fig. 1 Example display of the Salient Condition in Experiment 1. The
Control Condition was identical except that it did not contain an item
highlighted in red
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the right for the other half. In the Salient Condition, on 50% of
the trials, the red itemwas the largest value in the streamwhile
on the other 50% of the trials it was the smallest value. The red
item appeared in the stream that had a mean of 60 half of the
time, and the stream that had a mean of 40 for the remaining
trials. To ensure equal numbers of trials in each cell, there were
60 trials in which the red item appeared in the stream with a
mean of 60 and 60 trials where the red item appeared in the
streamwith a mean of 40 in the Salient Condition and 60 trials
in the Control Condition.
Results and discussion
Overall, participants accurately identified the stream with the
highest mean 86.2% of the time in the Salient condition and
88.7% of the time in the Control condition. The proportion of
times each stream was chosen is shown in Fig. 2. For the
Salient Condition, the proportion of times each stream was
chosen was entered into a 2 × 2 within-subjects ANOVAwith
factors of Stream Mean (60 or 40) and Red Item (High or
Low). The results revealed a significant main effect of
Stream Mean, F(1, 19) = 347.99, P < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.948, par-
ticipants chose the stream with a mean of 60 more often than
the stream that had a mean of 40. There was also a main effect
of Red Item, F(1, 19) = 15.03, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.442, partic-
ipants chose the stream with the high value red item more
often than the stream with the low value red item. The
Stream Mean × Red Item interaction was not significant, F <
1.
The data confirm the findings of Tsetsos et al. (2012) show-
ing that people could successfully integrate a rapid stream of
numbers to calculate an overall value. Considering the Control
Condition, we see that participants chose the stream with a
mean of 60 as having the highest overall value 88.7% of the
time. This is significantly above chance, t(19) = 18.38, p <
0.01, d = 0.948, and is consistent with the results of Tsetsos
et al. (2012). More importantly, similar to the results of
Experiment 1, having either the largest value number or
smallest number highlighted in red influenced people’s judge-
ments. Participants were less likely to pick the stream with a
mean of 60 as the highest value stream when the red number
highlighted a low value, t(19) = 3.87, P < 0.01, d = 0.661.
Furthermore, behaviourally, salient items seemed to bias
decisions only when their value was incongruent with the
overall value of the stream. Consider the streams with a mean
of 60. When the red number was low, people judged the
Salient stream as having a lower overall value more frequently
compared to the Control condition, t(19) = 2.2, P < 0.05, d =
0.465. However, when the red item was high there was no
difference in the proportion of times the Salient stream was
picked compared to the Control, t(19) = 1.03, P = 0.31, d =
0.195. Similarly, when the mean of the stream was 40, when
the red number was high people judged the Salient stream as
having a higher value more frequently compared to the
Control condition, t(19) = 3.13, P < 0.01, d = 0.551.
However, when the red item was low there was no difference
in the proportion of times the Salient stream was picked com-
pared to the Control, t < 1. Overall, when the red item was
incongruent with the valuation of the stream mean, it led to
less accurate judgements, irrespective of whether streammean
was high or low; conversely, when the red itemwas congruent
with the valuation of the stream mean, it did not improve
performance (however, this could be due to a ceiling effect).
Experiments 1–3 showed that embedding a salient item in
the stream affected people’s decision making, especially if it
was incongruent with other information that was being inte-
grated. These data are important as they add to Tsetsos et al.
(2012) model showing that bottom-up attentional factors play
a role in value integration. Furthermore, they suggest that if
items in the stream become over-weighted they affect people’s
value perception. This leads to an interesting question of
which items in a stream are weighted higher? Tsetsos et al.
(2012) suggested that recently viewed items bias value per-
ception, and Experiments 1–3 here showed that items in a
salient colour also bias judgements of value. Tsetsos et al
(2012) also suggested that, when asked to pick a stream with
the highest or lowest value, streams with a larger SD were
chosen more often. They suggested this occurred because
streams with a larger SD contained more extreme outlier num-
bers (e.g. high numbers or low numbers), which captured
attention by being over-weighted. We tested this hypothesis
directly in Experiments 4–7, in which we examined whether
outlier numbers captured more attention in a value psycho-
physics task than non-outlier numbers. To achieve this we
used a dual-task procedure to test two accounts: (1) A No
Capture account, which predicts that outlier items do not cap-
ture attention; and (2) an Outlier Capture account, which pre-
dicts that outlier items will capture attention and disrupt pro-
cessing of all further items within a stream. In Experiment 4,
we investigated whether high outlier numbers capture atten-
tion, and in Experiment 5 whether low outlier numbers cap-
ture attention. In Experiment 6, we determined whether high
Fig. 2 The proportion of times each stream was chosen to have the
subjective highest overall mean in the Salient and Control conditions of
Experiment 2. Error bars Standard error (SE)
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value numbers automatically capture attention, or whether
they capture attention only when participants are asked to
make a judgement of the stream mean. In Experiment 7 we
determined whether the dual-task impairment caused by pre-
senting an outlier number differed over lag.
Experiment 4
Method
Participants
Twenty participants (12 female) were recruited from the
University of Warwick participant pool. Their ages ranged
from 19 to 23 years. All participants had normal or corrected
to normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure were the same as those of
Experiment 1, except where reported. In this experiment par-
ticipants only viewed one stream presented at the centre of the
screen. All stimuli were presented in a light grey colour.
Numbers were presented at a faster rate of 15 ms/item, with
an ISI of 75 ms between each item, matching the presentation
rates of other dual-task RSVP studies (e.g., Raymond et al.
1992). Similar to the previous experiments there were 12
numbers in the stream. However, each stream contained two
critical values: the first critical value was the outlier in the
stream, ranging from 96 to 99 in the High Number trials (out-
lier present) or a neutral number ranging from 48 to 51 in the
Control trials (outlier absent). Each outlier number or neutral
number appeared on 12.5% of the total number of trials. This
ensured that the outlier numbers did not differ from the neutral
numbers in terms of frequency of appearance, but differed
only in terms of their magnitude. The second critical value
was the target. The target was either the number 19 or 21 (both
numbers appearing equally often) and was present on every
trial. In all trials, the outlier was presented at position 3 in the
stream. To avoid predictability, the target was presented at
either position 5 or 11 in the stream with equal probability
(Lag 2 or Lag 8, respectively, after the presentation of the
outlier). The remaining numbers in the stream varied from
10 to 89, and were generated to either create a desired stream
mean of 30 on half the trials, or 70 on the other half of the
trials. The average SD for each trial was 16.5. Participants
completed 200 trials in a single experimental block (100
High Number trials and 100 Control trials). Participants per-
formed a short practice block of trials before the experiment
began.
Participants made two judgements after each stream
presentation. First they indicated whether they thought
the mean of the stream was higher or lower than 50, by
pressing the ‘z’ or ‘m’ key, respectively. This ensured that
participants attended to the whole stream, and that they
were able to integrate information within the stream to
form an accurate judgement. Second, participants
responded whether they thought either the number 19 or
the number 21 had been presented in the stream by press-
ing the letters ‘x’ or ‘n’ respectively. They were not asked
about the outlier. However, if the outlier automatically
captured attention, we would expect to see impairment
in target detection when an outlier was present in compar-
ison to when it was absent. Example displays are shown
in Fig. 3.
Results and discussion
Accuracy for reporting whether the mean of the stream was
greater or less than 50 was high (89.3%). Trials on which
participants did not respond correctly were discounted from
further analysis. A two-tailed t-test showed that participants
were less accurate at detecting the target in the High Number
condition (0.66) than in the Control condition (0.69), t(19) =
2.22, P < 0.05, d = 0.172.
Consistent with Tsetsos et al. (2012), people were ac-
curate at calculating the integrated value of the stream.
Moreover, this integration occurred at presentation rates
of approximately 11 items/s—a rate faster than those that
have been presented previously (Tsetsos et al. 2012). The
data showed that people’s abilities to integrate multiple
sources of information can occur even when information
was presented very rapidly.
However, the results showed an overall dual-task defi-
cit. Participants were worse at detecting the target after
viewing a high outlier value number compared to having
viewed a non-outlier value. If we assume our two tasks to
consist of: (1) automatic processing of the outlier number,
and (2) detection of the target, the results showed that
having an outlier number impaired target detection more
(i.e., in the High Number condition) than not having an
outlier number in the stream (i.e., the Control condition).
The data are difficult to reconcile with a No Capture ac-
count, which predicts that there would be no deficit in
target detection between the Control and High Number
conditions. Instead, the data fit with an Outlier Capture
Time 
… 97 42 … 36 … 21 … 65 
Outlier Target
Fig. 3 Example display of the rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP)
stream in Experiment 3
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account, which proposes that the presence of a high, out-
lier number in a stream captures attention, leading to
poorer performance overall of the secondary task.
In Experiment 5 we examinedwhether low outlier numbers
also captured attention. If all extreme outliers captured atten-
tion we would expect to see a dual-task deficit here. However,
if only high value outliers capture attention then no dual-task
deficit should be observed.
Experiment 5
Method
Participants
Twenty participants (14 female) were recruited from the
University of Warwick participant pool. Their ages ranged
from 19 to 23 years. All participants had normal or corrected
to normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure were the same as those of
Experiment 4, except that the outlier was a low value
outlier ranging from 01 to 04 in the Low Number trials
or a neutral number ranging from 48 to 51 in the Control
trials. The target was present on every trial and was either
the number 79 or 81 (both numbers appearing equally
often).5 The remaining numbers in the stream varied from
10 to 89, and were generated to either create a desired
stream mean of 30 on half the trials or 70 on the other
half of the trials. The average SD for each trial was 16.5.
Participants completed 200 trials in the experimental
block (100 Low Number trials and 100 Control trials).
As in Experiment 4, participants made two responses after
each stream presentation. First they indicated whether the
mean of the stream was higher or lower than 50 by pressing
‘z’ or ‘m’, respectively, and then whether the number 79 or 81
had been present in the stream by pressing ‘x’ or ‘n’,
respectively.
Results and discussion
Accuracy for determining whether the mean of the stream
was above or below 50 was high (86.2%), and incorrect
trials were not analysed further. A two-tailed t-test
showed that participants were less accurate at detecting
the target in the Low Number condition (0.65) than in
the Control condition (0.69), t(19) = 2.96, P < 0.01, d =
0.386.
Overall, the results were similar to those of Experiment 3.
Detection of the secondary target was impaired in the Low
Number Outlier condition in comparison to the Control con-
dition. This occurred even though participants were not ex-
plicitly asked to attend to the low number. Again, the results
rule out a No Capture hypothesis because this would predict
that there would be no difference in target detection accuracy
between the Control and Low number condition. However,
the results concur with an Outlier Capture account, according
to which attention was generally depleted after viewing the
Low Outlier Number.
Interestingly, in our experiments we found that both
high and low outlier values captured attention, whereas
in Tsetsos et al.’s (2012) work participants only over-
weighted items that were congruent with their task in-
structions (i.e. high value numbers when they were asked
to pick the stream with the highest mean, and low value
numbers when asked to reject the stream with the lowest
mean) . The mos t l ike ly reason why we found
overweighting of both high and low numbers in our
Experiments 4 and 5 is because of the change in task that
we employed. Instead of asking participants to accept or
reject a stream based on overall mean (as in the work of
Tsetsos et al. 2012), we asked participants to make a
judgement as to whether the stream was higher or lower
than 50. In doing so, both high and low outliers would be
relevant to the task demands, and therefore susceptible to
attentional capture as shown. Taken together, the results
from both Experiments 4 and 5 showed that embedding
an extreme outlier in the stream leads to a dual-task
deficit.
One could argue that the reason that the outlier number
captured attention was that its value was important in
relation to making a judgement about the stream mean.
It may be that the outliers receive preferential processing
if participants adopt a heuristic of weighing extreme
values more when asked to calculate the mean of the
stream. In this case, the over-weighting of an outlier
would be based on a top-down mechanism applied strate-
gically rather than by the result of automatic attentional
capture. We investigate the mechanism behind the over-
weighting of outliers in Experiment 6 in which we again
ask participants to respond to a target in a stream (which
either follows an outlier number or a control); however,
we do not ask them to make a judgement of the mean
value of the stream. If participants use a top-down heuris-
tic to over-weigh the outlier number when making value
judgements, we would now expect to find no dual-task
deficit. Alternatively, if high outlier numbers automatical-
ly capture attention, we would expect a dual-task deficit
when the target appears after a high value item.
5 The target numbers changed to either 79 or 81 in this experiment as the
outlier numbers in the critical condition had changed to lower numbers. This
was necessary to meet the mean and variance constraints of the stream.
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Experiment 6
Method
Participants
Twenty participants (seven female) were recruited from the
University of Warwick participant pool. Their ages ranged
from 19 to 22 years. All participants had normal or corrected
to normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure were similar to those of Experiment
4, except that participants were not asked whether they
thought the mean of the stream was higher or lower than 50.
Instead they were only asked to respond whether they thought
either the number 19 or the number 21 had been presented in
the stream by pressing the letters ‘x’ or ‘n’, respectively.
Results and discussion
Similar to Experiment 4, a two-tailed t-test showed that par-
ticipants were less accurate at detecting the target in the High
Number condition (0.68) than in the Control condition (0.72),
t(19) = 2.88, P < 0.01, d = 1.808. This occurred even though,
in this experiment, participants were not asked to evaluate the
stream mean. Therefore the results are inconsistent with the
hypothesis that observers adopt a top-down strategy to over-
weigh outlier numbers when estimating the mean value of a
stream. Instead, the results suggest that outliers automatically
capture attention.
Experiments 4–6 found the existence of an overall dual-
task deficit when a target number followed an extreme outlier
number. Experiment 7 separates target detection across the
different lags of the stream (i.e. whether the target appears at
Lag 2 or Lag 8 following the outlier or control number).
Previous research has shown that detection of a secondary
target (T2) is impaired if it appears within 100–500 ms of a
primary target (T1, e.g. Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992,
Chun & Potter, 1995). This dual-task deficit is known as the
Attentional Blink (AB; Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992). If
we consider the outlier number in our experiments to be acting
as a primary target (T1), then we would expect detection of the
outlier number (T2) to be worse at Lag 2 than at Lag 8.6
Analysing the data across lag in Experiments 4–6 showed that
there were no differences in the accuracy of T2 responses
between Lag 2 and Lag 8 [F(1, 19) = 0.02, P = 0.89, ηp
2 =
0.001, F(1, 19) = 0.09, p = 0.76, ηp
2 = 0.005, F(1, 19) = 0.38,
p = 0.54, ηp
2 = 0.026 for Experiments 4, 5 and 6, respective-
ly). However, the absence of any reliable effects may be a
result of insufficient experimental power due to the number
of trials used. Therefore, we investigated this in Experiment 7,
in which we doubled the trial numbers to allow sufficient data
for an analysis across lags to be performed.
Experiment 7
Method
Participants
Twenty participants (14 female) were recruited from the
University of Warwick participant pool. Their ages ranged
from 18 to 22 years. All participants had normal or corrected
to normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure were similar to those of Experiment
4, except that the number of trials were doubled. Participants
completed 400 trials in a single experimental block (200 High
Number trials and 200 Control trials).
Results and discussion
Accuracy for determining whether the mean of the streamwas
above or below 50 was high (89.4%), and incorrect trials were
not analysed further. Figure 4 shows the Proportion of T2
correct responses. The proportion of correct T2 responses
were entered into a 2 × 2 ANOVA with factors of Outlier
(High Number vs Control) and Lag (Lag 2 vs Lag 8). This
revealed a main effect of Outlier, F(1, 19) = 8.83, P < 0.01, ηp
2
= 0.317, participants were more accurate in the Control con-
dition than in the High Number condition. There was a mar-
ginal effect of Lag, F(1, 19) = 3.74, P = 0.07, ηp
2 = 0.165,
participants were more accurate at Lag 8 compared to Lag 2.
The Outlier × Lag interaction was not significant, F(1, 19) =
2.06, p = 0.17, ηp
2 = 0.098. However, planned t-tests showed
that there was a significant effect of T2 accuracy at Lag 2,
where participants were less accurate in the High Number
condition compared to the Control, t(19) = 2.99, P < 0.01, d
= 0.2, but no effect of accuracy between conditions at Lag 8,
t(19) = 1.33, P = 0.2, d = 0.803.
The findings replicate those of Experiments 4–6 showing a
dual-task deficit of presenting a high outlier number prior to
the target number. Interestingly, separating the data across lag
also suggests evidence of an Attentional Blink, with planned t-
tests showing that accuracy in the HighNumber condition was
lower than in the Control condition at Lag 2, but not at Lag 8.
This pattern is consistent with what would be expected from
6 The number in Lag 2 occurs approximately 200 ms after the outlier number,
residing in the attentional blink, whereas the number at Lag 8 would appear
~800 ms after the outlier, thereby being outside the attentional blink.
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the attentional blink literature, in which a ‘blink’ occurs ap-
proximately 100–500 ms following the presentation of a pri-
mary target (Raymond et al. 1992). Note that as the Condition
× Lag interaction was not significant the data, although sug-
gestive, are not conclusive as to whether an attentional blink
occurred. However, importantly, as there was a main effect of
Outlier, the data fit with the hypothesis that having a high
number embedded in the stream leads to an overall dual-task
deficit.
General discussion
Previous work has shown that when people were shown an
RSVP stream containing multiple numbers they were able to
rapidly integrate this information to accurately determine the
overall value of the stream (Tsetsos et al. 2012). The data were
consistent with a model, in which decisions were influenced
by the temporal order of items, with more recent values bias-
ing people’s judgements, and by the framing or context of the
task (Tsetsos et al. 2012). Additionally, this model
encompassed a top-down, response-framing dependent
weighting mechanism, that highlighted the larger values when
the task was to select the highest stream or the smaller values
when the task was to reject the lowest stream. The work in the
current paper shows that as well as top-down influences,
judgements of integrated value are susceptible to biases by
bottom-up factors.
Experiments 1–3 investigated whether adding an irrelevant
but unique salient coloured number to the stream, affected
people’s judgements in a value psychophysics task.
Experiments 1 and 2 had participants make value judgements
on two identical streams presented in reversed order, while
Experiment 3 had people make value judgements on two
streams with different overall means (one a mean of 60 and
another a mean of 40). The data showed that if a stream
contained a high value coloured number it was more frequent-
ly judged to have a higher overall value than if the stream
contained a low value coloured item, regardless of the objec-
tive stream value. The results showed that embedding an
attentionally salient item in the stream affected judgements
about the stream’s worth as it captured attention, leading to
it being over-weighted. This meant that the salient number
biased people’s decision heuristics leading them to interpret
the overall value of the stream as higher or as lower than they
would have otherwise done.
One reason why the salient item was over-weighted might
be due to the isolation effect first reported by von Restorff
(1933). The isolation effect occurs when a distinctive item is
more likely to be recalled compared to other items that do not
have a distinctive feature (Badham & Maylor, 2013, see also
Hunt, 1995 & Wallace, 1965). It is hypothesized that the
stored representations of the distinctive item have a better
quality of encoding due to the uniqueness of the item leading
to more elaboration and rehearsal (Schmidt, 1991). According
to the Isolation Effect, in Experiments 1–3, the distinct
coloured item would have undergone better encoding that
would lead to its over-weighting in the stream’s memory rep-
resentation. Therefore, if participants based their decisions on
the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), where
better recalled information is deemed more important, then
their judgements would be influenced by the enhanced stored
representations of the coloured item.
Please note that the effect of the salient item might have
reflected strategic prioritisation. If participant’s were treating
the highlighted number as diagnostic (i.e. a low highlighted
number reflected a stream with a lower mean, and a high
highlighted number reflected a stream with a higher mean),
then they might have formed a strategy to prioritise the salient
item in order to make a judgement. In this case, although there
was a clear effect of salience, it could be that it was the result
of an intentional top-down weighting process.
Experiments 4–7 investigated whether outlier values items
in the stream captured attention, leading them to be over-
weighted. Tsetsos et al. (2012) suggested that streams with a
larger SD were either preferred or rejected depending on
whether people were looking for the best or the worst stream,
respectively. They proposed that this occurred because
streams with a high SD contained extreme outlier values that
swayed the decision. We investigated directly whether outlier
items captured attention using a dual-task technique. The re-
sults showed that both high (Experiments 4, 6 and 7) and low
(Experiment 5) outlier values captured attention impairing
performance of subsequent target detection. This dual-task
deficit was suggestive of an Attentional Blink where the cap-
ture provided by the outlier number was worse at Lag 2 than at
Lag 8 (Experiment 7). The data were used to test two ac-
counts: a NoCapture account, and anOutlier Capture account.
It was found that the data were not easily reconciled to a No
Capture account, as performance of target detection was worse
when an outlier was present compared to when it was absent.
Instead, the results favoured an Outlier Capture account in
which further processing of subsequent items in the stream
were impaired after viewing an outlier item. This suggests
Fig. 4 Proportion of correct T2 responses as a function of Lag in
Experiment 7. Error bars SE
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that, even when participants were not explicitly told to look
for the outlier item, it captured attention, leaving fewer atten-
tional resources available for other items in the stream. The
over-weighting of the outlier number also appeared to be
automatic/bottom-up as it occurred in conditions where par-
ticipants were not asked to estimate the value of the stream
mean (Experiment 6). These data provide a direct test of
Tsetsos et al.’s (2012) model, and concur with their theory
that, when integrating, value outlier items would receive a
higher top-down attentional weight.
One could argue that, in Experiments 4–7, the fact that the
task was to identify a number (e.g., 19 or 21 in Experiments 4,
6, and 7, and 79 or 81 in Experiment 5) encouraged partici-
pants to pay attention to each individual value that was pre-
sented in the stream. This might have been the reason why the
extreme numbers captured attention. If so, then the same effect
may not occur if the task was changed so that participants
were asked to respond to a non-numeric feature of the target
(e.g. look for a red item presented in a multi-coloured stream).
It is up to future research to investigate this. However, for now,
our results show that, when performing a value-based decision
task, extreme outlier numbers capture attention.
The theories surrounding human choice and decision mak-
ing are complex and sometimes puzzling (Tsetsos et al. 2012,
Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2015). Although ideal behaviour is
said to be governed by a series of calculated axioms that are
essential for optimal decisions (e.g., Von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 2007), human behaviour is often shown to be
more irrational than this (Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2015), and
can be based on sub-optimal decisions (e.g. Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979, Stauffer et al. 2015). Our findings add to these
data showing that human decisions on value integration were
influenced by irrelevant factors of colour. These findings ex-
tend the model theorised by Tsetsos et al. (2012) showing that
bottom-up factors, as well as top-down factors, play a clear
role in value integration. It has been suggested that, in the
absence of calculating optimal statistical inferences, observers
often employ a range of heuristics when sampling data, some
of which are adaptive and provide accurate judgements
(Gigerenzer, & Gaissmaier, 2011). Our work shows that, in
terms of making judgements and choices of value, participants
used a heuristic favouring both bottom-up and top-down at-
tentional cues in decision making.
Taken together, the results have implications for under-
standing how we evaluate and integrate different sources of
information to make overall judgements and decisions. The
results run counter to the argument that, in value integration,
all items are treated equally. Instead, our results showed that
attention plays a vital role in value formation, whether we
intend it to or not. People were not asked to attend the salient
items in Experiments 1–3 or the outlier values in Experiments
4–7 and yet these attentionally salient items still influenced
decisions and had a disproportionate bias on value judgements.
Although it might be obvious that salient items captured atten-
tion, it is of interest that these attentional factors led to changes
in the seemingly unrelated task of decision making. One ex-
planation for this could arise from the idea of reciprocal neural
interactions between brain areas involved in attention and emo-
tional valuation (Raymond et al. 2003). Recent research has
begun to examine the interaction that attention has on reward
and judgements (Anderson et al. 2011, Raymond et al. 2003,
Fenske et al. 2004, Raymond, Fenske & Westoby, 2005,
Kunar,Watson, Cole &Cox, 2014), suggesting that brain areas
involved in these tasks (e.g. the anterior cingulate and the
orbitofrontal cortices) are linked by neural circuitry (Fenske
et al. 2004, Raymond et al. 2003) and are concurrently activat-
ed during attention and evaluation tasks (e.g. Armony &
Dolan, 2002; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Vuilleumier,
Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). Knowing this, it follows that
manipulating attention may also result in a change in value.
Further research is needed to investigate what is occurring on a
neural level in the current experiments. Nevertheless, these
data have important implications for decision making showing
that seemingly irrelevant, yet attentionally salient attributes of a
task influence value judgements. Clearly, the way information
is presented can affect people’s worth of what was seen, and
our data bring together two, previously unlinked, aspects of the
human cognitive system, showing that decision making in-
volving the integration of information can be significantly in-
fluenced by attentional factors.
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